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The Jailed Pro Se Defendant and the
Right to Prepare a Defense
"Laymen," observed Justice Douglas in a statement echoed by Chief
Justice Burger, "foolishly trying to defend themselves, may under-
standably create awkward and embarrassing scenes."' A pro se de-
fendant's awkwardness in trying to defend himself against criminal
charges is far more distressing than some scene of simple social em-
barrassment: his distress challenges cherished illusions about our sys-
tem of justice. Procedural and evidentiary objections directed against
a pro se force us to realize that in order to relate a simple occurrence
to 12 peers, an ordinary man must have studied long and deeply a
hypertechnical science. Each pro se defendant crystallizes the reali-
zation that the justice applied to even the most commonplace of
crimes is not simple, and a just and ordinary man, standing alone
before a court, cannot necessarily expect to receive a just verdict.
An ordinary man needs a lawyer in order to assure himself a fair
trial. This empirical proposition, transformed into a legal maxim,
forms the basis for many seminal Supreme Court decisions.2 In Fa-
retta v. California3 the Supreme Court, cutting against the grain of
those decisions,4 held that a defendant has a constitutional right to
1. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 462 (1971) (Douglas, J.); accord, id. at
468 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
2. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
68-69 (1932).
3. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The decision has stimulated considerable discussion. E.g.,
Robbins & Herman, Pro Se Litigation-Litigating Without Counsel: Faretta or for Worse,
42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 629 (1976); Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se: Faretta v. California
and Beyond, 40 ALB. L. REV. 423 (1976); Comment, Faretta v. California: An Examina-
tion of Its Procedural Deficiencies, 7 COLUM. HUMAIN RIGHTS L. REV. 553 (1976); Note, A
Fool for a Client: The Supreme Court Rules on the Pro Se Right, 37 U. Prrr. L. REV.
403 (1975). The most extensive pre-Faretta analyses of the constitutional right to self-
representation reached inconsistent conclusions. Compare Garcia, Defense Pro Se, 23
U. MIiLmi L. REV. 551 (1969) (recognizing right) with Grano, The Right to Counsel:
Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1175 (1970) (denying right's
existence). A detailed empirical study of pro se defendants can be found in Comment,
The Right to Appear Pro Se: The Constitution and the Courts, 64 J. CRIM. L. &- CRIxI-
INOLOGY 240 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Illinois Sutvey].
4. As Justice Stewart, author of the majority opinion, recognizes. 422 U.S. at 832.
292
The Right to Prepare a Defense
conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel when he volun-
tarily and intelligently elects to do so. Thus, Faretta presents the
possibility of a pro se representation shockingly inferior to what may
be expected of the prosecution.
This Note examines circumstances in which this possibility becomes
near certainty: the situation in which a defendant who chooses to
represent himself is jailed before trial.5 A jailed pro se defendant
will almost certainly present an inadequate defense because pretrial
incarceration has prevented him from preparing any defense. Few
jails provide pretrial detainees either access to legal research materials
or the means to investigate factual aspects of a case. Although most
courts that have considered the problem have implied to the con-
trary,0 this Note argues that there exists a due process right to an
adequate opportunity to prepare. When a defendant exercises his
right of self-representation, he does not waive this right to prepare,
and thus, if the state restricts a pro se defendant's preparation by
jailing him before trial, it must provide alternative means of preparing
a defense. A practical alternative means of preparing a defense, a
means both benefiting the defendant and increasing the efficiency of
the judicial process, is the appointment of standby counsel to aid
the detainee in his trial preparation.
I. Due Process and Adequate Preparation
The decision to waive counsel is a serious one, and in all but a
few cases a foolish one.7 The right to counsel has been defined in
5. Though the Supreme Court made no note of the fact in its decision, Faretta
himself was a pretrial detainee. Appendix to Briefs at 36-38, Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Appendix]. Incarcerated in the Los Angeles County
Jail, Faretta expected to be given the opportunity to research his case in tbe jail library.
Id. at 38. That library was later found to be inadequate. Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal. 3d
518, 520, 531 P.2d 772, 773-74, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204, 205-06 (1975). In order to conduct the
investigations and interviews that would have been necessary in order to present a
defense, Faretta planned to employ a "legal runner," though it is unclear whether lie
expected the state to pay for the legal runner's services. Appendix at 38. Despite the
fact that the facilities provided pro se defendants in the Los Angeles County Jail are
far more extensive than in most of the nation's jails, see pp. 304-05 infra, Faretta's
incarceration would have presented a difficult obstacle to the preparation of a defense.
The trial judge's awareness of the difficulties of conducting a defense from a jail cell
certainly influenced his decision to deny Faretta's motion to proceed pro se. Appendix
at 35-38.
6. See notes 14 & 15 infra.
7. Whence the maxim that he who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client, quoted
approvingly by Justice Blackmun in his Faretta dissent. 422 U.S. at 852. There are,
however, many reasons for a defendant's decision to proceed pro se: concern about
the public defender's heavy caseload, see id. at 807; a perception that the public de-
fender lacks independence from the prosecutor, see People v. Brown, 51 Cal. App. 3d
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various terms;s the fullest expression of its various components is Judge
Bazelon's opinion in United States v. DeCoster, which incorporates
detailed guidelines from the American Bar Association Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice ° as standards for measuring the "rea-
sonably competent assistance" of counsel. Though few other courts
have been so specific in their delineations of the right to assistance
of counsel, the right certainly encompasses representation by an at-
torney who has made adequate preparation through both legal research
and factual investigation."1
When an accused waives the right to assistance of counsel, he must
also, of course, relinquish many of the collateral benefits traditionally
associated with representation. He cannot expect, for example, that
his own performance will be judged on appeal by the same standards
used to determine the effectiveness of an attorney's representation. "'
Adv. Sh. 284, 297, 124 Cal. Rptr. 130, 137 (1975); a judgment that the defendant himself
has greater experience than appointed counsel, see MacKenna v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35, 37-38,
40 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v. Artega-Alvarez, Nos. 73 Cr. 950, 74 Cr. 18 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), described in Flannery & Robbins, The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More Than
a Pawn in the Game, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 769, 781 (1975); an expectation that the
court will provide aid, see pp. 312-13 infra; a suspicion that the prosecutor will be less
than zealous in dealing with a pro se defendant, see Olsen v. United States, 390 F.
Supp. 1264, 1266 (D. Minn. 1975); Illinois Survey, supra note 3, at 249; the recognition
that a pro se defendant may, by calculated lapses from the role of attorney into that
of witness, testify without fear of cross-examination, see People v. Von Latta, 258 Cal.
App. 2d 329, 337, 65 Cal. Rptr. 651, 656 (1968); State v. Townlcy, 149 Minn. 5, 23,
182 N.W. 773, 781 (1921); a hope that his performance will elicit the sympathy of
the jury, see People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 16, 324 N.E.2d 322, 326, 364 N.Y.S.2d
837, 843 (1974); H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE A.IERICAN JURY 238, 319, 360 n.10, 368
(1966); a fear that acceptance of counsel will force a loss of control over presentation
of the case, see People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 787, 336 P.2d 937, 945 (1959); an
unwillingness to be represented by an attorney of a different color or political philosophy,
see People v. Fitzgerald, 29 Cal. App. 3d 296, 307, 105 Cal. Rptr. 458, 464 (1972); a belief
that the facts of the case are too complex to be mastered by an attorney, see United
States v. Redfield, 197 F. Supp. 559, 569-70 n.3 (D. Nev.), a! 'd, 295 F.2d 249 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 803 (1962); or simply a desire to save legal fees, see id. at 569.
8. E.g., Reed v. United States, 529 F.2d 1239, 1241 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting MacKenna
v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960)) ("counsel reasonably likely to render and
rendering reasonably effective assistance" (emphasis in original)); United States ex rel.
Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975) ("legal
assistance which meets a minimum standard of professional representation"); Moore v.
United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736-37 (3d Cir. 1970) (attorney's "exercise of customary
skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place").
9. 487 F.2d 1197, 1202-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973), modified after remand, 45 U.S.L.W. 2216
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976).
10. ABA PRoJEcT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971).
11. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973), modified after
remand, 45 U.S.LV. 2216 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976); Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636,
637-38 (5th Cir. 1970); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 849 (1968); see Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. Kent v. Maroney, 435 F.2d 1020, 1022 (3d Cir. 1970).
12. See p. 301 infra.
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Some courts have held that if a defendant decides to manage his own
defense, he must accept whatever disadvantages result from that de-
cision.13 The most startling of these disadvantages is that a pro se
defendant jailed before trial may be prevented from making prep-
aration for trial.14 The opportunity to perform the pretrial legal
and factual research necessary for the presentation of a defense is
seen as a concomitant of the right to counsel which does not survive
the waiver of that right.15 Such decisions amount to a rule that a
pro se defendant has no right to an adequate opportunity to prepare
his defense.
It is understandable that the right to an adequate opportunity to
prepare should have become bound up in the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of a right to counsel, if only because so many adjudications
have involved attorneys who, through inadequate preparation, have
deprived their clients of the right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel. 1 Yet a waiver of the right to adequate preparation by counsel
is not a waiver of the right to an adequate opportunity to prepare.
17
13. Minor v. United States, 375 F.2d 170, 172 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882
(1967) (quoting Smith v. United States, 216 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1954)).
14. See Lee v. Stynchcombe, 347 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (denial of pro
se defendant's request that jail authorities be instructed to provide him with books);
Walle v. Sigler, 329 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.
1972) (dismissal of habeas corpus petition alleging failure to supply access to law books
necessary for pro se defense); People v. Noah, 5 Cal. 3d 469, 479, 487 P.2d 1009, 1015-16,
96 Cal. Rptr. 441, 447-48 (1971) (trial court's denial of jailed pro se defendant's motion
for removal to facility providing greater access to legal materials not error); Chessman
v. People, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 173-74, 238 P.2d 1001, 1006 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915
(1952) (denial of jailed pro se defendant's motion for continuance on grounds that in-
carceration had prevented him from consulting law books and interviewing witnesses
not error); People v. Pearson, 150 Cal. App. 2d 811, 815, 311 P.2d 142, 144-45 (1957)
(no error if jailed pro se defendant's request to spend 15 hours in law library preparing
his case was denied). Contra, Martinez Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 594
(D.P.R.), aff'd on other grounds, 537 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976).
15. Walle v. Sigler, 329 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (D. Neb. 1971), afJ'd, 456 F.2d 1153 (8th
Cir. 1972). Note, however, that in its affirmance the Eighth Circuit refused to affirm the
district court's broad holding that a waiver of counsel amounts to a waiver of collateral
aids, such as a law library, necessary to preparing a defense. 456 F.2d at 1156. Rather,
the affirmance was based on the more limited holding of the Supreme Court of Nebraska
in the same case, 182 Neb. 642, 156 N.W.2d 810, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 880 (1968), that
since standby counsel had been directed by the trial court to provide the materials
requested by the defendant, no denial of access to legal materials had occurred.
16. See, e.g., Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 690-91 (6th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Fisher, 477 F.2d 300, 301-02 (4th Cir. 1973); Stokes v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 131, 136-37
(4th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 428 F.2d 10, 14 (3d Cir.
1970); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226-27 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968);
Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937, 941-43 (5th Cir. 1967).
17. Appellate courts have suggested colloquies that trial courts should conduct with
defendants in order to determine whether a waiver of counsel is voluntarily and in-
telligently made. Two of the most extensive of these suggestions were fashioned in
cases involving pro se defendants who were jailed. Yet neither of these suggested
colloquies contains any warning to the pro se defendant that his waiver of counsel may
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Rather, an adequate opportunity to prepare is a fundamental com-
ponent of due process, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments1 s Put another way, the state cannot prevent a jailed pro se
defendant from preparing his defense merely because he has chosen
to exercise his constitutional right of self-representation.
This distinct due process right to an adequate opportunity to pre-
pare may be seen, paradoxically, in cases claiming that ineffectiveness
of counsel has deprived defendants of due process. The classical stan-
dard for testing constitutional claims alleging ineffectiveness of coun-
sel-that the representation was so woefully inadequate as to shock
the conscience of the court and render the proceedings a farce and a
mockery of justice'O-springs not from the Sixth Amendment's guaran-
tee of assistance of counsel, but rather from the guarantee of due
process. The standard was devised by the District of Columbia Circuit
in a case holding that the Sixth Amendment requires no more than
result in a sharply curtailed opportunity to prepare his defense. See Hodge v. United
States, 414 F.2d 1040, 1048 n.E (9th Cir. 1969) (Ely, J., dissenting); United States v.
Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
18. Although this Note concentrates on a due process right to an adequate oppor-
tunity to prepare, it might also be argued that the Sixth Amendment rights to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with witnesses, and
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses by implication include the right to
the preparation necessary to exercise these rights. People v. Mersino, 237 Cal. App. 2d
265, 268-69, 46 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (1965) (wrongful interference with defendant's inter-
viewing of potential witnesses violates right to compulsory process as well as due proce.,s
and equal protection); cf. State v. Lerner, 112 R.I. 62, 76, 308 A.2d 324, .335 (1973) (state
constitution's compulsory process clause secures to defendant opportunity to prepare by"
interviewing potential witnesses). The Faretta decision said of Sixth Amendment rights
other than the right to counsel:
The rights to notice, confrontation, and compulsory process, when taken together,
guarantee that a criminal charge may be answered in a manner now considered
fundamental to the fair administration of American justice-through the calling
and interrogation of favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of adverse wit-
nesses, and the orderly introduction of evidence.
422 U.S. at 818. Yet if a defendant's calling and interrogating favorable witnesses, cross-
examination of adverse witnesses, and introduction of evidence is to be more than mere
charade, he must have the opportunity to prepare for trial.
19. At one time or other, all the federal circuits have utilized the farce and mockery
standard. See, e.g., Stone, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Post-Conviction Relief
in Criminal Cases: Changing Standards and Practical Consequences, 7 CoLUvI. HUMAN
RIGHTs L. Rav. 427, 428-29 & n.15 (1975) (collecting cases); United States v. Stern, 519
F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d
698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965); Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838, 842 (4th Cir. 1959); United States
ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 427 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953).
Most of the circuits, however, have deserted that standard, substituting specifically Sixth
Amendment standards which are more stringent in application. See Stone, supra at 431-35.
This substitution of more stringent Sixth Amendment standards to measure defense
counsel's performance will result, one may hope, in raising the level of that performance,
thus providing a powerful incentive for defendants to accept representation by counsel
rather than to insist on self-representation. Though the farce and mockery test is being
abandoned as a Sixth Amendment standard, it retains its original validity as a measure
for violations of the due process right to a fair trial.
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the formal appointment of counsel.20 In order to secure habeas corpus
relief on the grounds of ineffectiveness of counsel when counsel had
been formally appointed, the court held that a prisoner would have
to base his claim upon the due process guarantee of a fair trial. The
farce and mockery standard which the court devised was designed to
test such due process claims.
The farce and mockery standard places upon the complainant a
heavy burden in demonstrating the requisite unfairness, and review-
ing courts have been reluctant to allow their consciences to be
shocked.21 Yet it is clear that the standard is breached when inade-
quate preparation deprives the accused of his defense: in many cases
in which counsel failed to undertake investigation and research es-
sential to adequate trial preparation, reviewing courts have held
that the proceeding amounted to a farce and mockery of justice.22
The dynamics of trial are such that it cannot be said that inade-
quately prepared counsel invariably will render the trial a farce and
mockery of justice: an experienced and well-trained lawyer could,
perhaps, mount a respectable defense in a simple criminal trial with
very little preparation. However, when a pro se, untrained in law and
inexperienced in trial procedure, is forced to defend himself without
having had an opportunity to prepare, a trial that is a farce and
mockery of justice will almost certainly result. Any procedure so likely
to result in a deprivation of due process must itself offend due process.
As Justice Powell recently stated: "[P]rocedural due process rules
are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process
as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions."2 3
The due process guarantee of an adequate opportunity to prepare
20. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
21. United States v. Kelton, 518 F.2d 531, 534 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1021
(1975); see, e.g., Miller v. Hudspeth, 176 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949); Tompsett v. Ohio,
146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945); Hudspeth v. McDonald,
120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617 (1941).
22. E.g., Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967) (appointed counsel's totally
inadequate preparation and presentation of insanity defense and failure to object to
defendant's being forced to wear prison uniform in courtroom); Brubaker v. Dickson,
310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963) (allegations that trial counsel
failed to investigate and present defenses would, if proven, constitute denial of due
process); Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957) (defense counsel, member of
Ohio bar, unfamiliar with Indiana procedure and given no time to prepare); United
States ex rel. Thomas v. Zelker, 332 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (total failure of as-
signed counsel to investigate and prepare materials for defense); Goodwin v. Swenson,
287 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (defense attorney did not talk to potential witnesses
before trial and did not obtain copies of hospital records, police records, or defendant's
written confession); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1963) (defense counsel's failure to research applicable law deprived defendant of defense).
23. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).
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is also apparent in the line of cases requiring prison officials to make
meaningful the convicted prisoner's right of access to the courts. A
convicted prisoner, like an unconvicted pro se defendant, is not pro-
tected by the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the assistance of coun-
sel.24 Nevertheless, it has long been recognized that, as a fundamental
corollary of Fourteenth Amendment due process, prisoners do have
a right of access to the courts.
-
5
This due process right of access to the courts was once thought to
require only that the state refrain from placing obstacles between
petitioner inmates and the courts.26 In Gilmore v. Lynch,2 7 however,
a three-judge court held, with Supreme Court affirmance, that the
right of access to the courts is not limited simply to invalidating state-
imposed obstacles to court access.28 Rather it "encompasses all the
means a defendant or petitioner might require to get a fair hearing
from the judiciary on all charges brought against him or grievances
alleged by him."2 9 When indigent prisoners seek habeas corpus relief,
prison officials are required "to ensure that prisoners have the as-
sistance necessary to file petitions and complaints which will in fact
be fully considered by the courts. ' '30 The Gilmore court refused to
set forth any minimum quantum of aid that must be provided, re-
ferring the problem back to prison authorities for a solution. In the
flood of litigation that has followed Gilmore, however, the courts
24. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CoNsr. amend. VI. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969).
25. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
26. Thus, the Supreme Court struck down state regulations which required prior
approval of habeas petitions by prison officials, id.; which demanded payment of filing
fees for habeas petitions, Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); which prevented in-
digent prisoners from obtaining transcripts necessary in order to obtain post-conviction
relief, Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963);
which forbade inmates from mutual assistance in writ-writing, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483 (1969); and which prohibited inmate interviews with law students and paralegals,
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
27. 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub norn. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S.
15 (1971).
28. The Supreme Court's affirmance, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), is simply a cryptic citation
to Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). The affirmance contains a touch of iron),
since Johnson began as a "motion for law books and typewriter." 252 F. Supp. 783, 784
(M.D. Tenn. 1966). The district court, while invalidating regulations restraining inmate-
from mutual assistance at writ-writing, rejected the contention that the state was obliged
to furnish legal research materials, id. at 787, and the question was not considered either
on appeal, 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967), or in the Supreme Court's opinion, 393 U.S.
483 (1969). The case that forms the basis for unrepresented prisoners' claims for access
to legal materials, then, was affirmed on the basis of a case that actually denied such
access. No court, however, has suggested that the Supreme Court's affirmance of Gilmore
was qualified by these circumstances.
29. 319 F. Supp. at 110.
30. Id.
The Right to Prepare a Defense
have become more specific in defining the requisite assistance for
prisoners who are not represented by counsel, so that there has
emerged a substantial body of federal law governing almost every
aspect of prison regulation of inmate access to the courts. Federal
courts have determined, inter alia, the number and types of volumes
that should be contained in prison law libraries,:" the hours that
such libraries should be open, 32 the amount of legal research materials
that may be stored in cells, 33 the necessary supply of clerical ma-
terials,34 whether access to legal research materials must be granted
to prisoners in segregation and in hospitals, 35 and whether instruction
in the use of legal materials must be provided.36 The holdings, of
course, are not uniform, since each decision rests on a number of
unarticulated factors, including the conditions within particular pris-
ons and each judge's idiosyncratic reaction to the bizarre forms that
prisoner complaints sometimes take.3 7 Yet the clear result of Gilmore
and its progeny has been to guarantee that the convicted prisoner not
represented by counsel, unlike the unconvicted pro se detainee,38 will
31. E.g., Smith v. Bounds, 18 CRI.. L. REP. 2055, 2055 (4th Cir. Sept. 30, 1975),
cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1505 (1976); Gaglie v. Ulibarri, 507 F.2d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1974);
Stover v. Carlson, 408 F. Supp. 696, 699 (D. Conn. 1976); Padgett v. Stein, 406 F. Supp.
287, 297 n.8 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Craig v. Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656, 669 (D. Nev. 1975);
White v. Sullivan, 368 F. Supp. 292, 296-97 (S.D. Ala. 1973).
32. Stevenson v. Reed, 391 F. Supp. 1375, 1384 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Jordan v. Johnson,
381 F. Supp. 600, 602 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1975).
33. Noorlander v. Ciccone, 489 F.2d 642, 651 (8th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Carlson, 488
F.2d 619, 632-34 (7th Cir. 1973).
34. McCray v. Sullivan, 399 F. Supp. 271, 273 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd in part and rev'd and
remanded in part, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1975); Farmer v. Loving, 392 F. Supp. 27, 29
(W.D. Va. 1975); Stevenson v. Reed, 391 F. Supp. 1375, 1384 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
35. Kirby v. Blackledge, 530 F.2d 583, 586 (4th Cir. 1976) (opinion by Justice Clark);
Noorlander v. Ciccone, 489 F.2d 642, 651 (8th Cir. 1973); Knell v. Bensinger, 489 F.2d
1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 634 (7th Cir. 1973); Johnson
v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1383-85 (D. Del. 1974).
36. See Stanton, Convicts and the Constitution in Indiana, 7 IND. L. REV. 662, 672
(1974) (discussing Order, Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind. 1974), supple-
nnted, 390 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ind.), modified, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975)).
37. The experience of dealing with pro se prisoner petitions has caused judges to
describe them as "penniless ragamuffins gabbling surlily about a jumble of misfortunes
said to ha-,e befallen their authors," Doyle, The Court's Responsibility to the Inmate Liti-
gant, 56 JUDICATURE 406, 406 (1973); "disorderly, numerous, repetitious, discursive, and
sometimes mad," Becker, Collateral Post-Conviction Review of State and Federal Criminal
Judgments on Habeas Corpus and Section 2255 Motions-View of a District Judge, 33
F.R.D. 452, 453 (1963); and designed mainly to badger prison officials, defy authority, or
gain the respite from prison of a court appearance, Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 326-27
(Rebnquist, J., dissenting). It is certainly true that few plaintiffs other than prisoners
would litigate to the federal courts of appeals disputes over S.2A6, Rhodes v. Sigler,
4148 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1971), or a pair of shoes, Howard v. Swenson, 314 F. Supp. 883
(W.D. Mo. 1969), appeal dismissed per curiamn, 426 F.2d 277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 948 (1970).
38. When pretrial detainees have attempted to use the Gilmore decision to obtain legal
research materials, courts have generally held that the state satisfies its obligation to
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be provided with the collateral aids necessary to prepare adequately
for a court appearance.
Gilmore attempts to correct for convicted prisoners a deficiency
which Justice Sutherland described in the context of the unconvicted:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of law. If charged with a crime, he
is incapable, generally, of detennining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence .... He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one ...
If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it
of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellectao
If Justice Sutherland's frequently cited40 description is accurate, a
jailed pro se defendant who has no access to legal research materials
would seem utterly incapable of preparing a defense. The courts have
expressed concern that a convicted prisoner proceeding pro se cannot
obtain due process without the opportunity to prepare by doing legal
research; surely even greater concern is due the unconvicted (and
still presumptively innocent) jailed pro se.
The due process right to an adequate opportunity to prepare for
trial has also been articulated when the Government has attempted to
interfere with defense interviews of potential witnesses, either by
preventing defense contact with jailed witnesses or by warning wit-
nesses at liberty to avoid interviews with defendant or his counsel. In
such cases, courts have recognized that due process demands an ade-
quate opportunity to prepare for trial by interviewing possible wit-
nesses.41 Furthermore, where a jailed defendant is represented by
provide access to the courts by providing for the appointment of counsel and that such
materials need not be provided. Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 331-32 (5th Cir. 1975);
Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1973); Lee v. Styuchcombe, 347 F. Supp. 1076,
1080 (N.D. Ga. 1972); see Tate v. Kassulke, 409 F. Supp. 651, 657-59 (W.D. Ky. 1976).
Contra, Martinez Rodriguez v. Jiminez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 594 (D.P.R.), aff'd on other
grounds, 537 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1976). Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 840, 885-86 (M.1).
Fla. 1975). The "access to the courts" standard for convicted prisoners is inappro-
priately applied to unconvicted prisoners. The pro se defendant does not seek access to
the courts, but rather to exercise his right to self-representation when forced by the
Government to appear before the court. Nevertheless, if adequate preparation is neces-
sary for the meaningful exercise of the former, it is a fortiori necessary for the latter.
39. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
40. The passage has been set out in full in the Supreme Court's seminal right-to-
counsel cases. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). It was repeated in
Faretta-both by the majority, 422 U.S. at 833 n.43, and in the Chief Justice's dissent,
id. at 838-39.
41. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 187-89 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see McCabe v.
North Carolina, 314 F. Supp. 917, 921 (M.D.N.C. 1970); Coppolino v. Helpern, 266
Vol. 86: 292, 1976
The Right to Prepare a Defense
counsel who is unable adequately to prepare a defense because only
the defendant himself is able to identify exculpatory witnesses, it has
been held that the defendant must be freed from pretrial custody, since
otherwise his due process rights would be violated.42
In the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
then, rests a guarantee that the defendant in a criminal prosecution
will be granted an adequate opportunity to prepare his defense. This
is not to say that a pro se defendant may later complain that he was
denied a fair trial because of his own improvident strategy, bad tactics,
errors of judgment, lack of skill, mistake, carelessness, incompetence,
inexperience, or failure to prepare when the opportunity was avail-
able.43 Nor can he later complain that a different or better result
would have been obtained had he chosen to accept representation by
counsel.44 If, however, the state jails a pro se defendant before trial,
refuses to provide him access to legal research materials, prevents him
from contacting witnesses essential to his defense, and prohibits him
from conducting necessary investigations, the defendant may well
complain that the state's denial of an adequate opportunity to prepare
has compromised his due process right to a fair trial. As Judge Rives
has bluntly and accurately written: "Any experienced trial lawyer
knows that a purported trial without adequate preparation amounts
to no trial at all."
45
II. Faretta and the Opportunity to Prepare a Defense
The Faretta decision, it is true, makes scant mention of the diffi-
culties a pro se defendant may expect in presenting his defense, and
no mention at all of his difficulties in preparing one. The decision
F. Supp. 930, 935-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State v. Harr, 194 S.E.2d 652, 656 (IV. Va. 1973);
cf. Byrnes v. United States, 327 F.2d 825, 832-33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 970
(19614) (recognizing right without identifying its source). See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d
652-65 (1967 & Supp. 1974).
42. Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1970); see United States v. Pomeroy,
,185 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 981 (1974) (detainee released with-
out bail at close of Goernment's case for purpose of contacting witnesses).
43. United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975); Arnold v. United States,
414 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970). Defendants
who elect to represent themselves must be prepared to be treated as having the quali-
fications and responsibilities concomitant with the roles they have undertaken. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cantor, 470 F.2d 890, 892 (3d Cir. 1972); People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d
777, 793-94, 336 P.2d 937, 949 (1959); cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 nA6
(1975) ("The right of self-representation is not a license . ..not to comply with rules
of procedural and substantive law.")
41. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 831 n.46 (1975); see State v. Harper, 21 N.C. App.
30, 33-34, 202 S.E.2d 795, 797, rert. denied, 285 N.C. 375, 205 S.E.2d 100 (1971).
45. Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619, 624 (5tl Cir. 1967).
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casts much light around the historical base of the right to self-represen-
tation, but leaves in darkness the procedural superstructure which
the trial courts must erect upon that base. It might be argued that
this terseness in describing the procedure to be followed in trials of
pro se defendants springs from an assumption that the waiver of coun-
sel is a general waiver of the components of a true adversary criminal
trial, including the opportunity to prepare a defense. But neither the
Faretta majority nor its dissenters slights the value of the adversary
process; indeed, simply to describe the concerns expressed in the opin-
ion and its two forceful dissents illustrates the irreconcilability of
Faretta with a proceeding in which a jailed pro se defendant is tried
without having had adequate opportunity to prepare his defense.
To a remarkable extent, the same basic concerns about the adversary
process are shared by the majority and dissenters in Faretta; the ma-
jority and dissenters diverge largely in their perceptions of how the
adversary process is affected when a defendant represents himself. The
majority and dissenters agree that a defendant should have the oppor-
tunity to present his best defense. The majority perceives that in cer-
tain instances a pro se defense may, in fact, be more convincing than
one presented by counsel; 40 the dissenters fear that in all but an
extraordinarily small number of cases, an accused will lose whatever
defenses he may have if he attempts to represent himself.47 Majority
and dissenters share a concern that the defendant must perceive the
process as a fair one. The majority considers that a defendant would
harbor resentment against a process that forces a lawyer upon him
against his will; 48 the dissenters believe that the justice of a trial in
which an unwanted lawyer provides effective assistance should be an
adequate balm for almost any frustrated pro se defendant. 40 Majority
and dissenters agree that the government, with its obvious advantages
over the accused, must act in a responsible manner so that the public
faith in the criminal process is not imperiled. The majority perceives
that the foisting of an unwanted lawyer upon a defendant would
be viewed by the public as an act of governmental irresponsibility;O
the dissenters feel that public confidence in the criminal process is
46. 422 U.S. at 834.
47. Id. at 838 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Few pro se defenses succeed. See Nagel, Effects
of Alternative Types of Counsel on Criminal Procedure Treatment, 48 IND. L.J. 404,
409 (1973); Illinois Survey, supra note 3, at 249.
48. 422 U.S. at 834.
49. Id. at 849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 833-34.
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jeopardized when the government secures an easy conviction over an
inept pro se defendant.51
The majority and dissenters differ on the emphasis they place on re-
spect for defendant's freedom of choice: the majority honors such
choice out of "respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the
law"; " the dissenters deride such choice as a defendant's "folly"-
and the "'freedom' 'to go to jail under his own banner.' " The ma-
jority and dissenters also differ in their emphasis upon the strains
that pro se defendants place upon the adversary process. The majority
avoids discussion of such strains; the dissenters wory that the wide-
spread exercise of the right to self-representation will cause "the
quality of justice [to] suffer."55
These, then, are the concerns for the criminal adversary process
which animate both the decision and dissents in Faretta: that the ac-
cused have the opportunity to present his best defense; that the
accused perceive the criminal justice process as fair; and that the public
have confidence in the fairness of the adversary process. In addition,
the majority feels that courts should respect a defendant's freedom
of choice, and the dissenters hope to minimize strains on the adversary
process.
Each of these concerns is flouted when a pro se defendant who has
been unable to prepare an adequate defense because of pretrial in-
carceration confronts the adversary process. An accused who cannot
research an indictment cannot present his best defense because he has
no way of discovering what possible defenses exist; a defendant who
has been restrained from interviewing witnesses and conducting an in-
vestigation has little chance to present any defense at all, let alone his
best defense. It would be difficult for an incarcerated defendant to
perceive the criminal justice process as fair when that process holds
out with one hand the right of self-representation, yet with the other
prevents him from effectively exercising that right-especially when
more fortunate pro se defendants, free on bail, may exercise the "tra-
ditional right to freedom before conviction [that] permits the un-
hampered preparation of defenses."' 6 Nor can the public have much
51. Id. at 839 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 834 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., con-
curring)).
53. 422 U.S. at 849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 839 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States ex rel. Maldonado v.
Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1967)); accord, 422
U.S. at 849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 845 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
56. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
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confidence in an adversary process in which an unskilled defendant
not only faces a trained government lawyer, but also has been pre-
vented by the government from acquiring the rudimentary knowledge
lie needs in order to present his case. As for respect for the defendant's
freedom of choice, such respect is mocked when the choice offered is
between representation by counsel and the inability to prepare a de-
fense. Finally, the greatest strain on the adversary process may be ex-
pected from defendants who are not only unskilled and unlearned
but also unable to prepare. In short, the concerns animating Faretta
seem lifeless when a jailed pro se defendant is denied the opportunity
to prepare his defense.
III. The Dilemma and a Solution
A. The Dilemma of the Jails and the Courts
The conflict between the right to an adequate opportunity to
prepare and the right of self-representation would be no conflict
at all if a jailed pro se defendant were allowed to perform the
legal research and conduct the factual investigation necessary to
prepare a defense. However, most jails 7 are simply not equipped
to provide the services necessary for trial preparation. Jailers are
reluctant to allow limited releases for any purpose,58 and adequate
57. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) defines a jail as "[a]ny
individual facility operated by a unit of local government (that is, a municipality or
township with a 1960 population of 1,000 or more persons, or a county) for the detention
or correction of adults suspected or convicted of a crime." U.S. NATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SERVICE, NATIONAL JAIL CENSUS 1970, at 6-7 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as NATIONAL JAIL CENSUS]. This excludes, at one extreme, lock-ups and
drunk tanks, and, at the other, the state-operated jail systems of Connecticut, Delaware,
and Rhode Island, as well as federal institutions for the confinement of pretrial de-
tainees. On March 15, 1970, there were 4,037 institutions falling into the LEAA defi-
nition, holding a total of 160,863 persons, 83,079 (52%) of whom were pretrial detainees
or otherwise not convicted. Id. at 1.
By contrast, prisons are generally much larger, are under centralized state or federal
control, and confine prisoners serving terms longer than a year. A 1966 prison survey
found 398 such facilities (exclusive of satellite facilities) operated by the 50 states, Puerto
Rico, and the District of Columbia. The average daily population of these institutions
was 201,220. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMLNT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JLSTICr,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 179-80 (1967).
58. See, e.g., Note, Cry for Standards: Report on Living Conditions in Arizona's Local
Jails and Prisons, 1975 ARIz. ST. L.J. 351, 374 (only 2 of 31 Arizona jail facilities allow
limited prisoner releases for visiting); see also Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257,
283-84 (D. Md. 1972) (pretrial detainees not allowed to participate in work-release or
educational-release programs); Mattick, Tile Contemporary Jails of tile United States:
An Unknown and Neglected Area of Justice, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 777, 820 (D.
Glaser ed. 1974) (jailers and local officials have noted resistance to wider use of work-
release measures); H. MATrICK & R. SwEET, ILLINOIS JAiLs 235 (1970) (Illinois jailers and
sheriffs cite lack of facilities and insufficient personnel as obstacles to initiating work-
release programs).
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opportunity to interview prospective witnesses is not generally avail-
able." As for legal research materials, few jails provide any at all,60
much less anything approaching the $5,500 legal research collection
recommended by the American Association of Law Libraries as the
minimum adequate "for the most basic legal research that might be
done by a prisoner."' Nor is there thought to be any constitutional
duty for the jails to make legal research materials available to their
prisoners. 2 As a First Circuit panel tersely stated in Page v. Sharpe:
"Under no stretch of the imagination is a county sheriff, or his sub-
ordinates, required to supply law books."63
59. The National Jail Census reported that of 4,037 jails surveyed, 26% did not
even offer separate facilities for visiting. NATIONAL JAIL CENSUS, supra note 57, at 19.
Even where separate facilities exist, their usefulness to the jailed pro se defendant is
often limited by other factors. See, e.g., Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375, 1383 (D.
Conn. 1971) (warden has discretion to limit visitor privileges to detainee's attorney and
members of immediate family); Mattick, supra note 58, at 818 (most jails have no suitable
place for visiting; visitors must usually converse within earshot of guards and other
inmates); H. IATrICK & R. SwEET, supra note 58, at 199 ("Many [Illinois] jails have
no visiting facilities, severely restrict the length of individual visits, and set general
visiting hours so that few people will have an opportunity to come to the jail.") Of
course, even the finest visiting facilities are of no use if potential witnesses are unwilling
to visit the pro se defendant in jail. And restrictions may be imposed on telephone
usage. E.g., Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail v. Petersen, 353 F. Supp. 1157, 1169 (E.D.
Wis. 1973) (jail personnel have discretion to limit number of detainee calls to bondsmen
and attorneys, and to disallow calls to others except in emergencies).
60. See ABA CoMM. 1'ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERvICEs, JAIL INSPlEcTION AND
STANDARD SYSTEMs IN ILLINOIS AND SOUTH CAROLINA 10-21, 112 (1974) (in Illinois, only two
sets of Illinois statutes available to county jail inmates; otherwise necessary "to rely on
donations or the borrowing of books from library systems etc."; ill South Carolina, no
provision for legal research material of any kind); Prison Legal Libraries-Idea Into
Reality 18-19 (Apr. 22, 1972) (Proceedings of Conference Sponsored by Social Respon-
sibilities Round Table of the American Library Association and School of Librarianship,
University of California, Berkeley) (six basic law libraries established by N.Y. Dep't of
Corrections with assistance of LEAA grants and loans "ignore the needs of men in
county jails, in smaller institutions"); Note, supra note 58, at 378-81 (of 31 Arizona pre-
trial holding facilities, only 2 provide legal materials); Note, Pre-Trial Detention in the
New York, City Jails, 7 COLUMT. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 350, 361 (1971) (library resources of
New York City's houses of detention inadequate and often unavailable); see also U.S.
BUREA-u OF PRISONS, THE JAIL: ITS OPERATION AND MANAGEMENT 192-93 (1973) (providing
legal research materials to unconvicted prisoners not considered critical).
61. Am. Ass'n of Law Libraries, Recommended Collections for Prison Law Libraries,
in Am. CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICE IN CORRECTIONAL
INSTrrUTIONS 5 (1973). This $5,500 price tag does not include the cost of state law research
materials which, of course, all but federal prisoners would need. Nor does it include the
cost of annual upkeep for materials that constantly must be supplemented, or the cost
of housing and maintaining the collection. Prison libraries, not surprisingly, have major
problems in keeping their collections intact. See Haslam v. United States, 431 F.2d 362,
365 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912 (1971). The American Correctional Asso-
ciation envisages grandiose prison libraries with professional librarians especially trained
in audiovisual and legal reference services, the microfilming of legal reference materials,
and possible access to computer terminals at various points throughout an institution.
See At. CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, supra at 1-2.
62. The duty imposed by Gilmore extends only to convicted prisoners, not to pre-
trial detainees. See note 38 supra.
63. 487 F.2d 567, 569 (Ist Cir. 1973).
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The indigent pretrial detainee who wishes to defend pro se places
the courts and jail officials in a perplexing quandary. Under Faretta,
a trial court may not prohibit an accused from exercising his right of
self-representation simply on the grounds that the accused is jailed;
yet, if due process guarantees an adequate opportunity to prepare, a
reviewing court may reverse the conviction of a pro se defendant who
has been prevented by jail authorities from preparing his defenses.
Jail authorities, however, would be seriously burdened with the task
of providing adequate facilities for the preparation of pro se defenses.
The expense of law libraries in state and federal penitentiaries may
be justified by the large number of prisoners housed in such central-
ized institutions and the constant use that prisoners, with more re-
stricted rights to appointed counsel, are likely to make of such libraries.
The cost of providing similar libraries to the decentralized county
jails, where the average number of inmates is far smaller and where
most inmates have chosen to be defended by counsel, "4 would be ex-
tremely burdensome. One alternative, providing supervised law stu-
dents to aid in conducting necessary legal research, would be possible
only at jails conveniently close to a law school. Another alternative,
releasing prisoners under guard to conduct research in whatever facili-
ties are available in the community, would be likely to create drains
on jail manpower and possible disciplinary problems.
Preparation of trial defenses, unlike preparation of habeas corpus
petitions and civil suits attacking prison conditions, requires factual
investigation outside the confines of the jail. When witnesses to be
interviewed refuse to visit the jailed defendant, provision for telephone
interviews could be made. However, when a pro se defendant claims
that he cannot locate potential witnesses by telephone, and requests
that he be released in order to interview those witnesses, a difficult
decision must be made. Jail officials, by training, temperament, and
tradition, are ill-equipped to balance the value of a potential witness
against the costs of the jail manpower lost by having guards accom-
panying detainees during interviews outside the jail. To submit such
64. The percentage of defendants in criminal cases who choose to represent them-
selves is undoubtedly small. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 360-62 (defendant
without counsel only in 2.7% of jury trials in nationwide survey); United States v.
Redfield, 197 F. Supp. 559, 566 n.2 (D. Nev.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 803 (1962) (in 1960, of 93 defendants who entered pleas to criminal
charges in Las Vegas division of federal district court of Nevada, 10 waived counsel; of
49 defendants sentenced in Las Vegas, 10 waived counsel at time of imposition of sen-
tence). But ef. Illinois Survey, supra note 3, at 248 (widely differing figures in survey
of Illinois judges); Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the
Federal District Courts, 76 HARv. L. Rav. 579, 584 (1962) (in half of districts surveyed,
less than 20% of defendants waived counsel; in some districts, more than 80% did).
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requests to the courts would be particularly burdensome, requiring
exploration of a defendant's potential defenses well before trial in
order to determine the importance of specific witnesses to the de-
fense. 5 "Legal runners" and investigatory personnel could be provided
to aid in the preparation of the factual elements of the defense, but,
again, pretrial evaluation of a defendant's case would be required in
order to determine the amount of aid that should be provided.
Of course, jailed pro se defendants could be released in order to
prepare for their trials, but such a practice would undoubtedly cause
a massive expansion in the number of accused who wish to defend
pro se, for many pretrial detainees would certainly choose self-repre-
sentation simply in order to secure a temporary release from custody.
Defendants who formerly would have pleaded guilty may elect to de-
fend themselves at trial if a pro se defense may be relied upon to
delay their incarceration."0 The primary purpose of jailing defendants
before trial would be frustrated if defendants who intended not to
appear for trial could gain easy release from jail by feigning a desire
to proceed pro se. The provision of facilities for detainee case prepara-
tion would place a major strain on jails; the freeing of all pro se
defendants in order to prepare their cases, and the increase in the
number of pro se defendants which such a procedure might be expect-
ed to cause, would place an intolerable burden on the courts.0 7
B. Standby Counsel as a Solution
1. The Role of Standby Counsel
A solution to this dilemma is suggested in Faretta, both in the ma-
jority opinion and in the Chief Justice's dissent: the appointment of
65. Courts on occasion have made pretrial evaluations of a defense in order to de-
termine whether an incarcerated defendant should be freed from custody to aid in
trial preparation. See pp. 300-01 supra. Requiring courts to evaluate each jailed pro
se defendant's requests for temporary release would place a substantial burden on the
courts and might well require a defendant's disclosure to the court of prejudicial
information.
66. There is evidence that jailed defendants plead guilty more often than bailed
defendants. Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 693, 726 (1958). This tendency may be explained by a defendant's hope that a
guilty plea will result in a suspended sentence and release from custody and his cer-
tainty that, at worst, a guilty plea will result in his transfer to prison, where conditions
are generally less cramped and uncomfortable than in the jails. See Note, Pre-Trial
Detention in the New York City Jails, supra note 60, at 353.
67. This burden would be the result not only of an increase in the number of
contested criminal cases, see note 66 supra, but also of the delay, disorder, and con-
fusion that pro se defendants, even those with the best of intentions, cause within the
judicial process. See Laub, The Problem of the Unrepresented, Misrepresented and
Rebellious Defendant in Criminal Court, 2 DUQUESNE L. RLv. 245, 249-55 (1964).
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"standby counsel" to aid the indigent defendant if a jail is unable
to offer the facilities or programs necessary for the preparation of a
pro se defense.6 The appointment of standby counsel would safeguard
the accused's constitutional right to prepare: standby counsel would
be available to advise the pro se on matters of law, to conduct legal
research, to provide the pro se with legal materials that can be reason-
ably procured, to arrange for the interview of witnesses, to interview
witnesses himself if they cannot be interviewed by the defendant, and
to conduct factual investigations. In brief, standby counsel's duty would
be to make all preparations necessary for a defense that the defendant,
because of his incarceration, is prevented from making.
The actual scope of standby counsel's pretrial role would depend
upon the wishes and needs of the pro se defendant. In some cases the
defendant may choose not to rely on standby counsel at all, in which
case he may be considered to have foregone the opportunity to prepare
his defense. In other cases the defendant may request that standby
counsel transmit to the court requests for investigative, expert, and
other services, 9 that he take part in the plea-bargaining process,'"
or that he participate in pretrial hearings.7 1 In some cases demands
made by defendants upon standby counsel may be unreasonable, in-
volving requests for investigations unlikely to unearth evidence or
for pointless legal research. Unreasonable demands for services may
be submitted to the court for resolution.72 After good-faith research,
standby counsel may advise a pro se defendant that a claim lacks any
68. 422 U.S. at 834-35, 846 n.7 (Stewart, J., Burger, C.J., respectively). The appointment
of standby counsel is a well-established practice common in many jurisdictions. E.g.,
United States v. Harbolt, 491 F.2d 78, 80 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 848
(1975); United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1051-52 (2d Cir. 1971); People v. Pilgrim,
160 Cal. App. 2d 528, 530, 325 P.2d 143, 144 (1958); People v. Lindsey, 17 IIl. App. 3d
137, 141, 308 N.E.2d 111, 115 (1974). The practice is recommended in ABA PROJLcr
ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THr FUNCTION OF Tim TRIAL
JUDGE 87 (Approwed Draft 1972). It is also recommended by commentator.. E.g., Note,
The Right to Defend Pro Se: Faretta v. California and Beyond, supra note 3, at 442-45;
Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se-Faretta v. California: Due Process and BeYond,
11 U. TULSA L.J. 365, 390-92 (1976); Note, A Fool for a client: The Supreme Court
Rules on the Pro Se Right, supra note 3, at 414-15; Note, The Right to Defend Pro
Se in Criminal Proceedings, 1973 Vash. U.L.Q. 679, 700 n.21. Although standby counsel's
role has generally been limited to advising a defendant during trial proceedings, in
certain cases standby counsel has aided a defendant in the preparation of his case. See
People v. Heidelberg, 33 111. App. 574, 591, 338 N.E.2d 56, 70 (1975); State v. Walle, 182
Neb. 642, 644, 156 N.W.2d 810, 812, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 880 (1968).
69. See pp. 313-15 infra.
70. See pp. 315-16 infra.
71. See pp. 310-11 infra.
72. Similar issues are already resolved by the trial courts. See, e.g., pp. 300-01 supra
(release for interviewing witnesses); pp. 313-15 & note 97 infra (investigatory services
under Criminal Justice Act).
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discoverable legal basis but that, as a pro se defendant, he may, of
course, submit a claim to the court in spite of its frivolity.
Standby counsel's duty before trial is defined by the defendant's
right to an adequate opportunity to prepare; during trial, however,
the defendant has no constitutional right to the assistance of standby
counsel; 73 if both the court and the defendant choose to allow his
presence, standby counsel's role should be defined by considerations
of judicial order and decorum.74 Ordinarily the trial court should
honor such requests, since the participation of standby counsel un-
doubtedly will enhance judicial decorum rather than detract from it.7
There may, however, be certain cases in which the defendant's waiver
of counsel is mere charade, and the defendant expects standby counsel
to conduct the defense, while the defendant manipulates his right to
self-representation in order to engage in carefully calculated disrup-
tive conduct.70 Such cases are similar to cases of hybrid representation,
in which a defendant, accepting all the benefits of representation by
counsel, attempts to appear as cocounsel. Courts have been reluctant
to allow such hybrid representation, 77 fearing that a defendant may
73. Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d 466, 469 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927
(1969); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920
(1958); Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806, 812-13 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 346 U.S.
892 (1953). There is, however, some authority for the proposition that the Sixth Amend-
ment, in guaranteeing the assistance of counsel, envisages counsel who is truly an as-
sistant and whose services may be accepted or rejected to the extent desired by the
defendant. Such an interpretation guarantees to a defendant, even if he has insisted
upon exercising the right to self-representation, the services of standby counsel if he
so desires. Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Ky. 1974); see Note, Self-Representation
in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1479,
1507"12 (1971); Note, The Pro Se Defendant's Right to Counsel, 41 U. CIN. L. Rut.
927, 929-30 (1972); cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 820 (Sixth Amendment "speaks
of the 'assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant").
7.4. See State v. Whitlow, 13 Or. App. 607, 609-10, 510 P.2d 1354, 1355 (1973); see
also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
75. See United States v. Harbolt, 491 F.2d 78, 80 11.2 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 848 (1975) (after court dismissed counsel at defendant's request so that de-
fendant could proceed pro se, counsel allowed to continue representation when inter-
mittently called upon by defendant and court); Walle v. Sigler, 329 F. Supp. 1278, 1281
(D. Neb. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1972) (standby counsel allowed to par-
ticipate actively in trial on several occasions).
76. See, e.g., Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 920 (1958); United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); State v. Wynn,
391 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Mo. 1965); State v. Burkitt, 120 N.J.L. 393, 395, 200 A. 1005, 1006
(1938).
77. E.g., United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835
(1974); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
970 (1973); United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958
(1970); Brasier v. Jeary, 256 F.2d 474 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 867 (1958);
Overholser v. DeMarcos, 149 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). Faretta
has not erased this reluctance to allow hybrid represcntation. United States v. Lang,
527 F.2d 1264, 1265 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019, 1024 (10th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1676 (1976); United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 463
& n.2 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976).
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limit his participation to occasions on which he may engage in of-
fensive tactics, such as examining a witness he knows he can bully,Ts
making statements to the jury without fear of cross-examination,"M
or launching attacks on other defendants, government witnesses, and
public officials."0 If it appears that a pro se defendant intends to en-
gage in similar disruptive activity while at the same time depending
on standby counsel to conduct the brunt of the defense, a trial court
may well be justified in warning a defendant that it may impose limi-
tations on the trial participation of standby counsel, even to the ex-
tent of requiring standby counsel to be present merely in an advisory
capacity.
Pro se defendants who wish to prepare their cases by means of per-
sonal research and investigation might argue that reliance on stand-
by counsel for pretrial preparation is an unjustifiable limitation on
the right of self-representation. As yet, however, the right to self-repre-
sentation extends no farther than the right to make one's own defense
personally. 81 And the right to an adequate opportunity to prepare does
not guarantee that a pro se defendant be allowed to pick and choose
between various possible means of preparing a defense, but only that
if the state, by jailing a pro se defendant before trial, restricts that
defendant's trial preparation, it must provide alternative means of
preparing a defense.
It might be suggested that a resourceful pro se defendant may now
obtain the benefit of standby counsel's services simply by accepting
appointed counsel up to the date of trial and then dismissing his ap-
pointed attorney. Even after the Faretta decision, however, courts
have refused such untimely requests to proceed pro se,82 and with
good reason: since appointed counsel has prepared to present the case
78. See Overholser v. DeMarcos, 149 F.2d 23, 26 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
889 (1945); United States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. 805, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
79. United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835
(1974); State v. Whitlow, 13 Or. App. 607, 609-10, 510 P.2d 1354, 1355 (1973).
80. Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 726-27 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920
(1958).
81. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). Faretta, for example, has not al-
tered the courts' reluctance to allow hybrid representation. See note 77 supra. And most
courts continue to hold to the pre-Faretta position that a prisoner has no right to argue
his own appeal. In re Walker, 56 Cal. App. 3d 225, 128 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1976); Callahan
v. State, 354 A.2d 191, 194 (Md. 1976). But see Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976). Courts have also rejected the contention that Faretta allows a de-
fendant to waive the assistance of counsel in order to be represented by a nonlawyer.
Turner v. ABA, 407 F. Supp. 451, 477-78 (N.D. Tex. 1975); United States v. Corrigan,
401 F. Supp. 795, 799 (D. Wyo. 1975).
82. United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 49-51 (10th Cir. 1976); Sapienza v. Vincent,
534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1976).
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himself, the last-minute pro se is usually totally unprepared for self-
representation.
Even absent this consideration, there should be serious objection to
any scheme of partial representation which would allow a defendant
to be fully represented by counsel at one stage of the proceedings and
to represent himself at another. When a lawyer manages a lawsuit,
law and tradition allocate to him the power to make binding decisions
of trial strategy in all but a few areas.83 When an accused defends
himself, decisions of trial strategy are his; standby counsel is merely
advisory, and his performance may not be attacked on the grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel.s4 Partial representation by counsel,
however, creates two masters of a lawsuit and presents difficult prob-
lems in the allocation of control over a lawsuit. For example, if a
defendant, against all sound advice, adopts a strategy that no com-
petent counsel could possibly recommend, s5 an attorney representing
him only in pretrial motions must decide whether to make the com-
petent decision or to heed the wishes of his temporary client. If the
client's wishes prevail to the detriment of the defense, an appellate
court will probably be forced to decide whether counsel's failure to
take competent action in the pretrial hearing amounted to ineffective-
ness of counsel. In short, any scheme for partial representation forces
both the defense attorney and the courts to determine who, exactly,
is the dominus litis, for the term has never been written in the plural.
2. The Advantages of Standby Counsel
Serving as standby counsel may well seem a waste of professional
time, particularly wasteful to the public defender who is already bur-
dened by a crushing caseload.8 6 But appointment of standby counsel
is politically the most feasible solution to the problem of the jailed
83. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).
8t. United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 1970); see p. 301 supra.
85. Assume, for example, that the defendant wishes the jury to hear tape recordings
of a confession made without Miranda warnings because the defendant irrationally feels
that material within the recordings may evoke sympathy from the jury.
86. A 1973 survey found that a full-time public defender staff attorney handles, on
the average, 173 felony defendants per year. If assigned to handle misdemeanors, he
handles 483 defendants per year. Asked to consider the maximum number of defendants
that one full-time attorney could effectively represent per year, defenders reported
that one full-time attorney can represent no more than 140 felony defendants or 295
misdemeanor defendants. NAT'L LEGAL. AID AND DEFENDER Ass'N, THE OTHER FACE OF
JUSTICE: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL DEFENDER SURVEY 29 (1973); see LaFrance, Criminal
Defense Systems for the Poor, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 41, 43-44 (1974); WVice & Sewak,
Current Realities of Public Defender Problems: A National Survey and Analysis, 10
CRIM. L. BULL. 161 (1974); Recent Developments: The Right to Counsel-Argersinger v.
Hamlin: An Unmeet Challenge, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 67 (1975).
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pro se defendant's preparation for trial.57 And it is the most effective.
The advantages of standby counsel over other methods of prepara-
tion-both to the defendant himself and to the functioning of the
judicial system-are many. Being responsible for both legal and fac-
tual preparation, standby counsel can provide a coordinated defense
preparation. Pro se defendants often waste their efforts on filing a
flurry of motions rather than preparing for the trial itself,"8 and
standby counsel will be more effective and efficient in preparing
a defense than law students or paraprofessionals. By guiding a de-
fendant's preparation for trial, suggesting possible defenses, coordinat-
ing defense theories with factual investigations, and providing the
defendant with the knowledge he needs in order to make an adequate
presentation of his case, standby counsel may be expected to imple-
ment one of the Faretta decision's basic concerns: that the accused
have the opportunity to present his best defense.s9
Despite oft-repeated warnings by courts that a pro se defendant will
be granted no special concessions, 0 a pro se defendant's ignorance of
law and procedure often forces the court to assume a more active pos-
ture on the pro se defendant's behalf, guiding him in pretrial hearings
87. Reform of the nation's jail system has always been hindered by tile division of
responsibility for jails among a variety of state, county, and municipal executih e, legis-
lative, and judicial officials, for whom jail expenditures occupy a low priority. Sce
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICr, TAsK FORCE
REPORT: CORRECTIONS 165-66 (1967); Mattick, supra note 58, at 787; McGee, Our Sick Jails,
in R. CARTER, R. MCGEE & E. NELSON, CORRTrIONS IN A-ERIC% 92-95 (1975). It is highly
unlikely that support could be mustered among these diverse authorities for the sub-
stantial capital outlay necessary to provide "legal runners" or a law library for each of
the nation's 4,037 locally administered jails. See pp. 306-07 supra. And law student
volunteers are available only at certain fortuitously located jails.
The appointment of standby counsel, though not requiring an immediate large capital
outlay, may in the long run be more expensive than alternative means of providing
for pro se trial preparation. Even if, as is often the case, the public defender is appointed
to serve as standby counsel, such appointments exact costs by increasing the caseload
of the public defender and his investigatory services. The costs, howe cr, are less Nisible
because the substantial start-up costs of the public defender's office hate already
been borne. And, of course, the public defender's burden can be eased through use of
paralegals. See J. STEIN, PARALECLS: A RESOURCE FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND CORREC-
TIONAL SERVICES 8-22 (Nat'l Inst. of Law Enforcement & Crim. Justice 1976). The most
economical method of providing for pro se preparation will, of course, vary from district
to district, depending upon the size of jails, the number of pro se defendants, the
availability of law students, the possibilities of limited releases, the caseload of the
public defender, and a series of other generally unquantifiable data.
88. See Appendix, supra note 5, at 35-36.
89. See State v. Walle, 182 Neb. 642, 645, 156 N.V.2d 810, 812 (1968) (services of
public defender as technical advisor of much greater value to defendant untrained in
law than access to fplly equipped law library).
90. E.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 nA6 (1975); United States v. Cantor,
470 F.2d 890, 892 (3d Cir. 1972); People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 793-94, 336 P.2d
937, 949 (1959).
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and in his presentation at trial.91 Such judicial intervention, though
necessary to protect the fairness of the proceedings, fundamentally al-
ters the nature of an adversary trial. Standby counsel may guide a
pro se defendant past the errors compelling judicial intervention and
thus aid in implementing another concern of Faretta: the need to
minimize strains on the adversary process.
Courts often appoint standby counsel when they fear that a pro
se defendant's disruptive conduct may force termination of his self-
representation.- In addition, it often happens that a pro se realizes in
mid-trial: " 'I find myself drowning ... I have to get my own self ...
somebody that knows how to swim so he can help me swim out.' ,,93
If standby counsel is not available to assume the conduct of the trial,
a pro se defendant's second thoughts confront the court with a Hob-
son's choice: it must either refuse the request for counsel (at the risk of
later reversal for denying the right to assistance of counsel), declare
a mistrial, or recess until newly appointed counsel can familiarize
himself not only with the facts of the case but also with the transcripts
of the prior proceedings. When standby counsel is available, a pro se de-
fendant's mid-trial request for the assistance of counsel creates little
inconvenience.
The appointment of standby counsel for pro se defendants creates
another benefit. Because the right to an adequate opportunity to
prepare has traditionally been bound up in the right to effective as-
sistance of counsel, investigative assistance is provided by statute to
counsel for indigent defendants, but not to indigent pro se defendants
themselves. The Federal Criminal Justice Act provides that investi-
gative, expert, and other services necessary for an adequate defense
may be requested in an ex parte application by "[c]ounsel for a person
who is financially unable to obtain" such services.04 Services may also
be obtained without request, but subject to later review and a $150
limit, by "counsel appointed under [the Act]." 95 State statutes simi-
91. See Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 781 (1948); State v. Pritchard, 227 N.C. 168,
169, 41 S.E.2d 287, 287 (1947); Illinois Survey, supra note 3, at 249; cf. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519 (1972) (allegations of pro se complaint should be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers).
92. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 404 U.S. 455, 467-68 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
see, e.g., United States v. Corrigan, 401 F. Supp. 795, 800 (D. Wyo. 1975); Commonwealth
v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855, 864 (Pa. 1976).
93. State v. DeLuna, 110 Ariz. 497, 501, 520 P.2d 1121, 1125 (1974). See United States
ex rel. King v. Schubin, 522 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir. 1975) (pro se defendant requested
standby counsel to assume conduct of case shortly before summation); Laub, supra note
67, at 252 (reporting case in which pro se defendant, satisfied with standby counsel's
preparation, requested that he conduct defense).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
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larly precondition state payments for corollary services upon a re-
quest by defense counsel.00
Provision of corollary services for indigent defendants need not
necessarily be conditioned upon a request by defense counsel,"7 but
there is good reason to do so: the provisions of the Criminal Justice
Act and the corresponding state acts are subject to abuse by the uin-
scrupulous, and the application of a statutory standard for government
reimbursement of defense-chosen expert assistance is a complex matter
for legal determination.S A trial judge, unless he is to explore pos-
sible defenses himself, must "have a healthy respect for the judgment
of the defense attorney in making his findings of necessity."' The
ethics of defense counsel and his concern for his professional repu-
tation tend to ensure that an application for collateral services is not
frivolous. Professional ethics and judgment, however, are not to be
expected from the jailed pro se defendant. In addition, application
through standby counsel relieves the defendant from having to reveal
potentially damaging information to the court in order to support
a request for corollary services.
To deprive an indigent pro se defendant of the services of investi-
gators, psychiatrists, and other experts, while providing such services
to indigent defendants represented by counsel, seems an unfair dis-
crimination. The purpose of the Criminal Justice Act is to guarantee
"the crucial right of an indigent to reasonably fair equality with those
who have adequate financial means to protect their rights."'1 Indeed,
there is some authority to support the argument that an indigent
criminal defendant has a due process right to court-appointed experts
96. See IowA CODE ANN. § 775.5 (West Supp. 1976); MINN. ST,-T. ANN. § 611.21
(West Supp. 1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:6 (Supp. 1973); OHio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2941.51 (Page Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILMED LAws ANN. § 23-2-2 (Supp. 1976); TNx s
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1976-1977). But see FL%. STAT.
ANN. § 914.06 (Harrison 1974); ILL. ANN. ST.T. ch. 38, § 113-3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976-
1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-19 (1969); UTA CODE ANN. § 77-64-1 (Supp. 1975).
97. Certainly when standby counsel disagrees that collateral services are necessar , the
pro se defendant should be allowed to petition the court directly, subject to the court's
close scrutiny of the request. The possible abuses of unwanted counsel's "final say in all
but a few matters of trial strategy" was one of the factors that influenced the Farctia
decision, 422 U.S. at 812 n.8.
98. See United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 257-58 (9th Cir. 1975); United State,
v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907, 909-11 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp.
234, 241 (D. Neb. 1966).
99. United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
984 (1973) (Wisdom, J., concurring); accord, United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 725
(9th Cir. 1973).
100. United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1975). Accord, H.R. Rur.
No. 864, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AV. NLws
2990, 2993 (Pres. Kennedy's letter transmitting proposed Act).
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where his case would be prejudiced by their absence.101 If the fair-
ness of the adversary system is to be maintained, indigent defendants
must have access to minimal defense aids; these collateral aids are
especially important to a pro se defendant who is prevented by in-
carceration from conducting his own defense preparation. Application
by standby counsel would enable pro se defendants to receive these
aids without generating further strains on the judicial system.
A final advantage provided by the appointment of standby counsel
is that standby counsel is available, at a pro se defendant's request,
to participate in the plea-bargaining process. During trial, a prosecu-
tor's misconduct may be limited by the watchfulness of the judge and
the possibility of reversal on appeal. However, judicial participation
during the plea-bargaining process is extremely restricted,'0 2 and there
is no written record upon which a charge of prosecutorial unfairness
can be based. Without a procedure that can be relied upon to dis-
courage over-indicting,' 13 bluffing,10 4 or taking advantage of a defen-
dant's demoralization caused by confinement, 1°5 the dangers of prose-
cutorial manipulation of untrained litigants is great.10 6
Of course, if the pro se defendant wishes to enter directly into
plea bargaining with the prosecutor, his wishes must be honored.
And standby counsel can no more bind a pro se defendant to a plea
bargain that he has struck than could appointed counsel bind his
101. United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 716-17 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 984 (1973) (Wisdom, J., concurring); Bradford v. United States, 413 F.2d 467,
473-74 (5th Cir. 1969); see Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert
and Investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 632 (1970);
Note, The Right to Aid in Addition To Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47
MINN. L. REV. 1054 (1963). Contra, United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540,
546-47 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1953). If such a constitutional right to the
collateral aids necessary in presenting a defense does exist, the Criminal Justice Act
should be interpreted, despite its restrictive wording, to provide such services for all
pro se defendants, jailed or unjailed. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829
(9th Cir. 1970) (Criminal Justice Act funds used to compensate standby counsel).
102. See Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 287 n.5 (1972)
(documenting hostility of appellate courts and commentators to judicial participation in
plea bargaining, but noting that limited participation may be widespread).
103. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CH. L. REv. 50,
S6-87 (1968); Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS
108, 109-10 (1967); Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney,
55 GEO. L. REV. 1030, 1035-36 (1967).
104. See Alschuler, supra note 103, at 56-57; Polstein, How to "Settle" a Criminal
Case, 8 PRAc. LAw., Jan. 1962, at 35, 41; Rossett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 ANNALS
70, 71-72 (1967).
105. See White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA.
L. REV. 439, 444 (1971).
106. See generally ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LTING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 10-12 (Approved Draft 1968); see also ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITy DR 7-104 (1975).
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clientlOT However, the participation of counsel in the plea-bargaining
process, even if that participation is limited to providing advice and
information, will help ensure that the plea is reliable, that the risks
of litigation have been considered, and that no unfair advantage has
been taken of the defendant. 0 8
Conclusion
A jailed pro se defendant is usually gTanted little opportunity to
prepare his defense. Yet an adequate opportunity to prepare is a
fundamental component of a fair trial. The jailed pro se, then, pre-
sents a striking case of conflict between Faretta's Sixth Amendment
right of self-representation and the due process right to a fair trial.
This Note has suggested a measure to smooth the edges of that conflict:
the appointment of standby counsel. Perhaps, in truth, no jailed pro
se defendant can expect a trial as full and fair as the trials of his
jailmates who are represented by counsel. Appointment of standby
counsel is not a pro se defendant's panacea, but if pretrial incarcera-
tion deprives a pro se of all other opportunities to prepare a defense,
due process requires no less.
107. The plea bargain is binding only when the defendant makes a voluntary and
intelligent guilty plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); ef. United States
v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2231 (1976) (de-
fendant's voluntary and intelligent guilty plea precludes defendant from asserting that
his right to self-representation was infringed).
108. See A. GOLDSTEIN & L. ORLAND, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 186-87 (1974); see generally
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1973) (representation of counsel frequently in-
volves highly practical considerations, e.g., plea-bargaining prospects, as well as specialized
legal knowledge).
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